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PRACTICING LAW IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Thomas D. Morgan*
Practicing law in the interests of justice-in the twenty-first or any
other century-will be harder than it looks. A lawyer's well-advised
client frequently wants almost any outcome but justice. A client's
well-prepared lawyer often invokes legal authority that is unlikely to
produce justice and relies upon an adversarial system that may make
justice at best an incidental result.
Professor Deborah Rhode has approached that hard reality with
admirable temerity.' She has offered three "general principles" under
which to organize reform of the lawyer's complex world:
1. Lawyers should accept personal responsibility for their
professional acts.
2. Citizens should have equitable access to legal services
and a choice among services.
3. Lawyer professional regulation is too important to leave
entirely to lawyers.2
I wholeheartedly agree with each of these principles and with many
of her other calls for reform. In particular, I agree that lawyer
professional rules have often provided ways to avoid the demands that
ordinary morality would make of non-lawyers. I also agree that
lawyer control of the lawyer regulatory system has probably helped
deny justice to many and increase the price of justice for all.
Indeed, I agree with so many of the causes that Professor Rhode
has championed over the years that this paper could become
excessively fawning. Thus, I will qualify my admiration by suggesting
that Professor Rhode tends-like most of us who write about legal
ethics-to deal largely with the twentieth-century experience through
which we have lived. Some of those issues have crossed the millennial
divide and none of us can see ahead perfectly, but I hope in this article
to try to take seriously the call of this colloquium's title to focus on
*Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust & Trade Regulation Law, The George
Washington University Law School. Antonella Karlin provided helpful research
assistance in preparation of this article.
1. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
(2000) [hereinafter Rhode, Interests of Justicel.
2. Id. at 17-20.
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some likely realities of the century ahead that will affect how lawyers
may conduct their practice.
This article will suggest eight ways that I believe the practice of law
seems likely to develop over the next twenty years or so. I believe
three evolving realities will run throughout the developments-a
growth in the demand for services lawyers traditionally have provided,
increased client choice among service providers and thus increased
client influence on the way law is practiced, and expanded lawyer
opportunities for building a practice that includes a well-ordered life.
1. DEMAND Is LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO GROW FOR WHAT HAVE
BEEN CALLED LEGAL SERVICES
Over the last century the number of lawyers grew almost ten fold,
from just over 100,000 in 1900 to over one million today.3 A
consistent fear among lawyers throughout the century was that the
supply of lawyers would soon exceed the demand for their services.4
Some saw the unmet legal needs of the poor and the middle class and
hoped the new lawyers would provide a way to meet those needs,5 but
somehow the expected lawyer surplus never came.
Economist B. Peter Pashigian has provided what I believe is still the
best analysis of the demand for legal services. He found that growth
in demand for legal services is most closely related to growth in
national GDP.6 That is, if the GDP increases three percent in a given
year-as it has on average over the past twenty-five years-the
demand for lawyers will increase about three percent as well and
annually absorb about 30,000 new entrants to the profession, just to
do the kinds of business-oriented work most lawyers do.
The reason for this relationship may be that a lawyer's role in
society most often involves what Dean Robert Clark has called
3. The figure for 1900 is taken from Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 280
(1989); the current figure is widely assumed to be true based on projections from
American Bar Foundation data reported in Barbara A. Curran, et al., The Lawyer
Statistical Report (1985) and its periodic supplements.
4. See, e.g., Homer D. Crotty, Who Shall Be Called to the Bar?, 20 Bar Examiner
173, 175 (1951) (suggesting that permitting use of the G.I. Bill for law school threatens
"possible serious overcrowding of the bar"); John C. York & Rosemary D. Hale, Too
Many Lawyers? The Legal Services Industry: Its Structure and Outlook, 26 J. Legal
Educ. 1, 22-25 (1973) (suggesting that graduates of "new" or "least selective" law
schools are not as likely to find jobs as the number of law students expands in the
1970s).
5. See, e.g., Barbara A. Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report
of a National Survey (1977).
6. See, e.g., B. Peter Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the
Demand For and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J.L. & Econ. 53, 53 (1977); see also, Thomas
D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 625
(1994) (updating Pashigian's statistics). For another analysis of the demand for
lawyers, see Richard H. Sander & E. Douglas Williams, Why Are There So Many
Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 1989 Law & Soc. Inquiry 431.
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private "normative ordering," i.e., facilitating transactions, planning
for their consequences, resolving disputes associated with them, and
seeking to affect the regulatory structure in which they are
conducted.' It also may affect the impact of economic activity on
third parties, but the justice concern about equitable allocation of
legal services is likely to continue to find poor and middle class victims
competing with better-paying clients for the scarce time of people
offering legal services.
2. DISTINCTIVELY LEGAL SERVICES WILL DECLINE IN
SIGNIFICANCE AND COMPETITION WILL BE THE OVERARCHING
FORCE AFFECTING LAWYERS
Lawyers who remember the 1950s and 1960s as the "golden age" of
practice purport to remember a time when a lack of real competition
was part of what it meant to be a professional. Whether that was ever
really true, it certainly will not be true in the twenty-first century. In
coming years, lawyers are likely to experience a continued breakdown
in the number of issues seen as distinctively "legal" in character and
that require a lawyer's advice.
Mergers, for example, are increasingly driven more by issues of
accounting and finance than by corporation or antitrust law. Lawyers
like to think they are good at everything, but professionals in
accounting and finance are equally likely to think they can look up the
law or hire relatively inexpensive lawyers to do it for them.
Even some traditional legal issues are now often international in
scope and beyond most domestic lawyers' expertise. Mergers of U.S.
businesses, for example, can face as much risk from European
regulators as from those in the United States, as General Electric and
Honeywell learned when objections raised by the European
Competition Commission killed their merger after the U.S.
Department of Justice had approved it.8 Thus, the skills on which
lawyers are tested when they are granted a license to practice in a
particular U.S. jurisdiction often have little or nothing to do with the
work they will be asked to do for twenty-first century clients. As
clients begin to internalize that reality, lawyers will find even fewer
issues within their distinctive expertise.
7. Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61
Fordham L. Rev. 275, 281 (1992); see also Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do,
Let's Kill All the Economists: An Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the
United States Economy and Political System, 70 Tex. L Rev. 645 (1992) (asserting that
economic studies are not conclusive evidence that the United States has too many
lawyers); Ronald L. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 Yale LJ. 239 (1984) (discussing the way in which business lawyers
add value to a transaction).
& See, e.g., 81 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 14-15 (2001).
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Clients, especially business clients, are likely to demand a varied
mix of services and traditional law firms will not be their obvious
supplier. A greater and greater share of those services likely will be
provided by teams of professionals in large organizations, in part to
reduce the costs of searching for providers of individual services and
in part to realize the benefits of closer relationships with fewer outside
firms. Indeed, not only will other professionals try to deliver what
have traditionally been called legal services,9 but the stakes will rise as
law firms seek to assemble teams of persons to serve their existing
clients."0 If recruiting a finance specialist will encourage clients not to
change firms, for example, there will be intense competition to hire
such a specialist.
Changes in the methods of delivering legal services will only
increase the competitive pressure. Even today, some firms are
delivering legal services directly over the Internet. Some services, for
example, can be tailored to a client's needs revealed by a
questionnaire that the client completes on-line."
3. CLIENTS WILL TEND To USE FEWER OUTSIDE LAW FIRMS AND
LAWYERS WILL TEND To HAVE GREATER AFFILIATION WITH
THEIR CLIENTS
A recurring complaint of older lawyers decrying the alleged decline
in lawyer professionalism has been the perceived loss of the lawyer's
role as trusted client adviser. 2 The decline is seen not only as a loss of
prestige; it represents a diminishing of the lawyer's alleged former
ability to steer client conduct toward the common good. A second
effect of the decline in influence has been the tendency to abandon
general retainer fees under which firms would meet all a client's
reasonable needs for a fixed price, and move instead to hourly-rate
billing with its associated dehumanizing consequences for lawyers.' 3
9. See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Texas Investigates Unauthorized Practice of Law by
Big Six Firm, Tax Notes, Sept. 19, 1997, at 1521.
10. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary
Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core
Values Debate, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1115 (2000); James W. Jones, The Challenge of
Change: The Practice of Law in the Year 2000, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 683 (1988).
11. Leading firms delivering such services today include Linklaters and Clifford
Chance Rogers & Wells, both based in London, and Blake, Dawson & Waldron,
based in Sydney. When the client and lawyer never meet face to face, the location of
each becomes irrelevant, except as a matter of court regulation. For an introduction
to such developments, see Richard Susskind, The Future of Law: Facing the
Challenges of Information Technology (1996) and Richard Susskind, Transforming
the Law: Essays on Technology, Justice and the Legal Marketplace (2000).
12. See Sol M. Linowitz with Martin Mayer, The Betrayed Profession: Lawyering
at the End of the Twentieth Century 30-32 (1994).
13. Id. at 28, 97-98; Michael H. Trotter, Profit & the Practice of Law: What's
Happened to the Legal Profession 7-8 (1997).
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Some of those complaints are highly suspect. Lawyers still advise
business clients; the advisers simply tend to be inside general counsel,
not outside law firms. General counsel are often corporate officers,
part of the management team, and correctly perceived to know more
about the client's interests and concerns than outside counsel ever
could.
However, it is likely that outside counsel will regain at least some of
the insider role they covet. The effects will not all be positive, but
outside counsel may increasingly look more like inside counsel who
are simply housed elsewhere. What will drive that development is the
same technology that allows communication with a law firm across the
country-or around the world-almost as easily as with counsel down
the hall. Indeed, systems now being introduced will allow clients
direct access, for what is likely to be a fixed price, to law firm files,
including billing records, depositions, and legal or factual research on
whatever the firms and their clients decide is relevant to the clients'
needs and consistent with the firms' obligations to other clients. 4
If increased interconnection of inside counsel and outside firms
comes to pass, reliance on hourly-rate billing as the principal measure
of a lawyer's worth may also decline. This will tend to reduce a major
source of frustration experienced by lawyers'5 and put the principal
focus back on the value they are adding to their clients' activities. In
that sense, Professor Rhode's view of practice in the interests of
justice seems likely to be enhanced.
On the other hand, a tendency to have outside counsel become
more like inside counsel may intensify the concern about lawyer
independence.16 My own view is that the concern about inside
counsel's loss of independence can be exaggerated. Companies and
their lawyers differ widely as to how much dissent the chief executive
can tolerate and how much bad news she can be told. To the extent
difficulty giving independent advice impedes a lawyer's ability to
practice in the interests of justice, however, the difficulty may be
exacerbated by the decrease of inside counsel's independence.
14. The technologies are widely advertised in lawyer publications, and, even when
discounted for puffing, the implications are enormous. See, e.g., Neil Cameron, Client
Portals: 20 Years Late But Moving Fast, The American Lawyer, July 2001 (advertising
insert).
15. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 1, at 10, 35-37.
16. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L Rev. 1
(1988); see also Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49
Md. L. Rev. 255 (1990) (discussing the ideal corporate lawyer as a public servant and
a servant of the client).
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4. LITIGATION WILL BE AS ADVERSARIAL AS THE RULES ALLOW
AND AS CLIENTS DEMAND
Professor Rhode is clearly correct that "what is professionally
convenient is not always socially desirable."' 7  The client-centered
adversarial system in which lawyers' work often tends to produce
results in which broad public benefits are at best a fortuitous
consequence. A client injured by a dangerous product may prefer a
generous settlement with a pledge of secrecy, for example, to a lesser
sum that includes public disclosure of the danger, and the defendant
may be only too happy to agree.18
Indeed, if I am even close to right about the emerging competitive
pressures on lawyers and the consequent leverage of their clients, this
problem is likely only to get worse. One sometimes hears calls for
more alternative dispute resolution as a way out of the problem, 9 but
that largely confuses process with substance. Even at its best,
mediation is no guarantor of justice; indeed, the effort to reach
settlement can become a search for the party least able to hold out.
Further, when authoritative precedent for future cases is a significant
object of litigation, even an otherwise favorable settlement may
constitute a defeat.2'
Professor William Simon has suggested that lawyers should alter
today's client-centered system and use "contextual judgment" to
pursue justice even where their clients' interests might dictate another
result.2 If a plaintiff's lawyer has demanded less for her client than
justice requires because of a failure to discover a critical fact, for
example, Simon suggests that defense counsel should disclose the fact
so the ultimate settlement will be higher.' A lawyer certainly may
have what is sometimes called a "moral conversation" with her client
and propose such a disclosure,' but surely taking the action behind
the client's back can only set the lawyer against the client. As long as
clients can choose among lawyers, lawyer disloyalty as a long-term
17. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 1, at 50.
18. Several such examples may be found in Richard Zitrin & Carol M. Langford,
The Moral Compass of the American Lawyer: Truth, Justice, Power, & Greed 183-
208 (1999).
19. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution:
New Issues, No Answers From the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities,
38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 407 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the
Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5
(1996).
20. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale
L.J. 1073 (1984).
21. William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 138
(1998).
22. Id. at 141-42.
23. Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Lawyers, Clients and Moral
Responsibility 40-54 (1994).
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strategy will have a very low probability of adoption and an even
lower probability of success.
Professor Bob Tuttle and I have taken a quite different view,
suggesting that compliance with legal and professional rules is prima
facie the proper moral course-as well as the only practical course-
for the lawyer trying to achieve justice.24 To say we live in a complex
moral world understates the problems lawyers face.
In the twenty-first century-as in the twventieth-a lawyer's loyalty
is likely to be to the client and that loyalty will have to be pursued
"zealously within the bounds of the law." - It will often be true that at
least one party will want to be as adversarial as possible, and until
rules such as those of broad confidentiality 6 and permitting secret
settlements are changed, the adversary system will produce an inferior
brand of justice. On the other hand, Professor Rhode is clearly
correct that if lawyer rule compliance were not seen as the prima facie
moral standard, the clients who benefited most from the change
"would not be the poor and oppressed."' Changing bad legal and
professional rules should be among a lawyer's public interest
objectives, and many lawyers and professors have been leaders in that
effort. While they are in force, however, the rules we have are likely
to provide the best guides for lawyers trying to preserve integrity in
dealings with both their clients and third parties.
5. LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE MIDDLE CLASS INCREASINGLY WILL
BE PROVIDED THROUGH NEW MEDIA AND INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS
BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES
Provision of services to the middle class has long been a serious
concern for persons worried about justice for all. Lawyer referral
services have tried to match lawyer availability with client needs, and
group legal service organizations have tried to create pools of clients
large enough to justify lawyers addressing those needs.
I believe the next significant group of suppliers in the twenty-first
century, however, will be those who help clients help themselves,21
and banks and insurance companies who want to serve other needs of
24. Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist
Society, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 984 (1995).
25. Both the command of zealousness, and the explicit limitation on zealousness,
are found in Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7.
26. Important amendments to Model Rule 1.6 were proposed by the ABA
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (Ethics 2000), but in August
2001, the most ambitious changes were again rejected by the ABA House of
Delegates at the urging of the American College of Trial Lawyers.
27. Interests of Justice, supra note 1, at 78.
28. See e.g., Joan C. Rogers, Cyberlawyers Must Chart Uncertain Course in World
of Online Advice, 16 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 4, at 96 (Mar. 15,
2000); Julee C. Fischer, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protection of
Protection or the Legal Cartel?, 34 Ind. L Rev. 121 (2000).
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the clients as well. Bar organizations are likely to resist such
developments with all the resources at their command. It will be said
to be not only the unauthorized practice of law by a corporation, 29 but
a traditional conflict of interest as well, because the corporate sponsor
might engage in various other business transactions with the clients."
However, those objections will not necessarily succeed. Insurance
company provision of legal services is well established in the context
of auto and homeowner liability litigation.3' When a company
similarly pays for the cost of a insured's house closing, adoption, name
change, or the like, we call it group legal services. In both cases,
insured clients receive services from lawyers they often hardly know,
but one rarely hears objection to the quality of those services.
The next step in these developments may be bank provision of
estate planning services or assisting lay executors in the administration
of estates. Similar kinds of help may come from investment advisors
or financial planners. At least in the early years, the services may be
provided by lawyers working for the commercial organizations,, but
the services may soon be standardized and delivered by non-lawyers
either in person or via telephone or Internet.
These developments will be a blow to lawyers who see traditional
individualized services turned into relative commodities, but from the
point of view of the middle-class clients, they may spell the difference
between adequate services and no services at all. In that sense at
least, they will genuinely expand the sense of justice experienced by
those middle-class clients.
6. SERVING THE POOR WILL BECOME AN INCREASINGLY
SPECIALIZED ACTIVITY
A system in which people bid for lawyers' time will always have
problems serving the poor. One obvious solution would be
mandatory pro bono service by lawyers, but that seems unlikely to
happen soon. When proposed to the ABA in the early 1980s, lawyers
refused to accept the burden.3 The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission
almost proposed a similar recommendation last year, but that time it
was professional poverty lawyers who were most opposed.33
29. The definitive work on unauthorized practice remains Deborah L. Rhode,
Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1981).
30. The principal prohibitions are Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 1.7(b)
& R. 1.8(a).
31. This kind of service has traditionally been justified as an exception to the usual
rules because the insurance company seems largely to be representing its own interest
in minimizing the liability of its insured. Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing
Lawyers § 134, cmt. f (1998).
32. Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 6.1 that deals with pro bono services,
is the only Model Rule expressed in aspirational rather than mandatory language.
33. The debate proceeded over several Commission meetings but a flavor of the
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I have become increasingly convinced that mandatory pro bono
service would probably not be practical even if lawyers were willing to
assume the burden. My concern is not that lawyers are so specialized
that they cannot become familiar with legal issues facing the poor.
More telling, issues of language proficiency will increasingly define
who can and cannot deliver services to our most vulnerable citizens in
the new century. Individualized service for persons from all over the
world will not be provided on a large scale by part time professionals.
Instead, funding for legal services for the poor will have to come from
a combination of public and private sources. Public funding through
the Legal Services Corporation has survived attempts to kill it
altogether; that source will be important but sums available will be
hard to increase.
Private support must be sought more aggressively. Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom gained significant prestige from its creation of
a fellowship program for public interest work, for example, and other
firms may see a similar opportunity. Professor Marc Galanter's
proposal for making more use of senior lawyers in a transition to
retirement is yet another imaginative possibility.-
Yet another approach might involve creating incentives for lawyers
to bring actions on behalf of poor persons. Some such incentives are
now provided by fee shifting statutes and class actions, for example,
although each presents problems of its own."- The simplification of
legal processes and increased use of non-lawyers to provide routine
services are other possibilities. None of this will be easy,-' but I
believe that if private lawyers and their firms consider it to be in their
interest to create such opportunities, these efforts can at least begin to
increase justice for the poor.
7. LAWYERS WILL HAVE INCREASING OPTIONS FOR USE OF THEIR
OWN SERVICES IN AREAS OTHER THAN LAW
As Professor Rhode reports, many lawyers today are depressedY
They work too hard, earn too much, are appreciated too little, and
spend insufficient time at home or working on matters that make a
difference in public life.' However, I believe there is room for
debate can be seen in the minutes for the December 1999 meeting found at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/121099mtg.htm.
34. Marc Galanter, "Old and In the Way". The Coming Demographic
Transformation of the Legal Profession and Its Implications for the Provision of Legal
Services, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 1081.
35. No single law review article can capture all of these ideas, but both the
possibilities and risks are seen in, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under
Cloak of Settlement, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1051 (1996).
36. See Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 1, at 14041.
37. Id. at 23-44.
38. See, eg., Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of
an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L Rev. 871 (1999).
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optimism about these issues and that such concerns may prove
cyclical. The kinds of competitive forces that have made lawyers
miserable, in short, can be harnessed to provide them hope.
The jump in entry level salaries paid to young lawyers in recent
years can be traced to the fact that dot-coin companies and investment
banks were pursuing many of the same people. On the other hand,
government offices, corporate legal departments, and law schools
have attracted lawyers seeking better ways to balance time demands
of work, family, and community. My point is not that lawyers must
choose between law firms and these other ways to use their training; it
is that law firms competing for people who have alternatives will have
to offer comparable opportunities or lose the people upon whom they
rely for the source of their competitive strength.
One should not be naive about the ease or speed of such market
adaptation, but the fundamental point is that lawyers have many more
options than they seem to acknowledge. Just as non-lawyers will
increasingly compete for the work of law firms, people with legal
training can increasingly expect to be able to see a better mix of
compensation and responsibilities to meet their needs? 9
8. SIGNIFICANCE OF PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WILL AND
SHOULD DECLINE
Bar associations, imagining themselves to be acting in the British
tradition, have sought to set lawyers apart from the rest of the
economic world. Holding ourselves out as a profession, lawyers are
regulated by courts, and Professor Rhode correctly diagnoses the
problems that such insularity has produced.0
However, I believe that the evolving developments outlined above
will increasingly break down the walls dividing lawyers from others.
Reputation, not licensing, will tend to be the guarantor of quality, and
private actions against lawyers who fail to perform up to standard will
tend to replace formal discipline as the regulator of lawyer activity.4'
Even today, malpractice insurance companies have an incentive to
audit lawyer compliance with professional standards more rigorously
than lawyer disciplinary commissions will ever do.
39. I believe this analysis will also apply to redress at least some of Professor
Rhode's concern about overt discrimination, or at least to her concern that firms have
not adapted well to the needs of women and people of color. Rhode, Interests of
Justice, supra note 1, at 38-44. However, I must admit that firms are more likely to
accommodate the needs of large groups of persons in their firms, e.g., persons with
family responsibilities, than needs of smaller groups such as gay and lesbian lawyers.
40. E.g., id. at 207-13.
41. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev.
799 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869 (1990).
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Even more important, these developments will tend to free lawyers
from the constraints of role morality.42 A person who can take a job
either in a law firm or another entity altogether cannot fairly say she is
compelled by her lawyer status to do things that as a non-lawyer she
would deem indefensible. Indeed, the decision to use a legal
education to practice law in a traditional manner will increasingly
itself have to be seen as a moral choice. And while the courts might
preserve an evidentiary privilege for communications with some legal
representatives, the much broader confidentiality requirement
imposed on lawyers today could more easily be narrowed. Thinking
selfishly as a teacher of legal ethics, when opportunities for moral
choice are again seen to be an integral part of lawyer conduct, focus
on fundamental moral questions will become even more central to a
lawyer's education.
The rate at which the changes I have outlined will occur is likely to
depend primarily on how quickly the world returns to a state of
vigorous economic growth. The current war and world-wide
slowdown in economic activity will inevitably slow the creation of
new kinds of service providers.43 Thus, we may have a momentary
breather before competitive reality hits lawyers with its full force. It is
appropriate in this symposium, then, that we acknowledge what is
coming and assess its revolutionary impact on our ability to practice
"in the interests of justice."
42. Professor Rhode has long urged the need to free lawyers from professional
regulation that inhibited them from doing what moral sensibilities would dictate was
right. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L.
Rev. 589 (1985).
43. On the other hand, it might enhance the development of others. When people
are afraid of flying, for example, acceleration of forms of Internet practice may
dramatically increase.
Notes & Observations
